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Abstract 
This thesis studies the existence of confirmation bias in financial markets using real trading data and 
survey results. With this unique data set, I am able to observe whether and how confirmation bias 
may affect trading behaviors of investors in financial markets. Survey respondents are asked to 
forecast which one out of six listed firms will achieve the highest return next month. Some 
respondents were also asked to provide justification when forecasting. The sample used for this 
experiment comprised of student traders enrolled in a semester-long course who were surveyed prior 
to company contract trading at the Iowa Electronic Markets (IEM). This thesis examines whether 
forecasting unconsciously altered their trading behavior, resulting in additional confidence towards 
their initial forecast, which would indicate signs of confirmation bias. I find that traders that 
forecasted Microsoft to earn the highest return also ended up with higher net aggregate positions in 
the Microsoft contract, traded at the IEM. This finding is consistent with confirmation bias affecting 
investment decisions of traders in my sample. The main limitations of this study are the small sample 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Bias 
 People instinctually tend to be adamant towards their initial beliefs due to the innate displeasure 
of feeling wrong in one’s understanding. One can conclude that this habitual confidence stems from 
a conscious or unconscious desire to be correct in one’s opinions and ideals, which is called bias. 
The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines bias as “an inclination of temperament or outlook” which, 
in more simple terms, means to be inclined towards current habits or beliefs; also implying an 
unconscious leaning towards a certain supported belief or idea. Unconsciously being more attentive 
to information supporting predisposed beliefs and ideas is referred to as a more specific type of bias: 
confirmation bias.  
1.2. Confirmation Bias 
Confirmation bias is often used while reasoning and choosing any belief. When considering a 
simple argument, someone might point out an opinion that another initially disagrees with and 
immediately recalls information and facts that only supports the same corresponding opinion. In this 
action, the individual arguing their side may be exactly that, one-sided, and in turn avoid even 
thinking of information that would argue against their belief. Any encounter that does not consider 
both sides of an argument fairly equally is likely to include some confirmation bias. If an argument 
or explanation of reasoning contains any bias, it tends to be flawed because of the lack of 
objectiveness in the search for a correct answer or solution to a problem. This lack of objectiveness 
will lead to a distinct disregard towards information that refutes the current belief. However, 
individuals that may have considerably greater awareness and intelligence should be able to 
differentiate themselves by attempting to consistently consider all aspects of any dilemma, not only 
those that may support a desirable or preferable belief. This definitely is not as simple to put into 
action as it is into words because, most of the time, the exclusion of contrary information is done 
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unconsciously. However, somehow reminding oneself to be attentive to all possibilities is a strong 
defense against confirmation bias.  
Though confirmation bias is not defined as an unconscious act, it is often true when observing 
financial situations because most individuals are not likely to purposely disregard information if it 
could lead to a loss of money. People generally put a large amount of importance on their money 
and will take necessary actions, such as further research and a more open perspective, to attain 
earnings and avoid losses. Although it may sometimes be beneficial to behave according to a certain 
bias, people are more likely to simply overlook information unknowingly rather than intentionally 
disregarding information that would disprove their beliefs. Britannica provides a credible definition 
of confirmation bias as “the tendency to process information by looking for, or interpreting, 
information that is consistent with one’s existing beliefs”. When referencing a financial activity, such 
as investing or trading, confirmation bias can be detrimental by leading to overlooked or missed 
opportunities or a loss of wealth due to overconfidence. 
2. Literary Review: Confirmation Bias  
2.1. History 
The term confirmation bias originates from the field of psychology dating back to 1960 in an 
experiment by an English psychologist, Peter Wason, who tested individuals on guessing a sequence 
to a set of numbers. The set of numbers is 2, 4, and 6 and individuals can ask if any other set of 
numbers is acceptable and follows the same rule as the sequence (Nickerson, 1998). The first 
assumptions are usually that the rule is a set of even numbers, or increasing by 2, which if testing 
either of those hypotheses, one would seem to prove themselves correct, although they are not. In 
turn, participants would tend to seek information that confirms their beliefs while rarely considering 
testing sequences that do not follow their predisposed belief (Mynatt et al., 1977). The correct rule 
is a simple one: a set of increasing numbers.  If one would simply test a sequence in which they 
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believe should not follow the rule, they are more likely to come to the correct solution because they 
may come across some sequence that follows the rule which they initially believed would not. This 
motion actually considers counterarguments to one’s own current beliefs which in turn avoids 
confirmation bias and creates a more credible opinion. 
The framework behind confirmation bias has existed many years prior to the actual terminology, 
and probably since the beginning of human reasoning, likely due to overconfidence in one’s beliefs. 
People do not want to be proven incorrect in their ideals and will focus on information and reasoning 
that is in support of their beliefs.  Francis Bacon, a famous English philosopher, born in the 16
th
 
century, expressed the idea that human’s “draw all things to support and agree” with their 
predisposed opinions (Nickerson, 1998).  This is clearly problematic because only entertaining 
information from one side of an argument, or that affirms one’s sense of self, will likely lead to 
misjudgment. Historical analysis suggests that a requirement to avoid confirmation bias when 
forming a hypothesis should include testing alternative hypotheses, paired with finding evidence to 
confirm the current hypotheses (Mynatt et al., 1977). The consistent nature for people to search for 
evidence confirming the current hypothesis without testing alternative theories is the driver behind 
confirmation bias. Following this rule and testing all possible outcomes to a question will likely 
diminish confirmation bias and build a more reputable opinion. As one might concur, dismissing or 
ignoring relevant information that may disprove a predisposed belief will likely lead to many issues 
executively, politically, and financially. 
2.2. Modern Confirmation Bias 
A common issue leading to confirmation bias is the lack of considering one’s alternative beliefs. 
In the article “Confirmation Bias in Complex Analyses”, Lehner et al. (2008) recommend a 
procedure to avoid confirmation bias by exhibiting more analysis of competing hypotheses, or 
Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH). This correlates to the earlier notion of focusing on 
 
6  |  P a g e  
conflicting ideas to one’s current belief because this analysis requires the individual to consider 
varying possibilities or hypotheses more deeply. Without considering and entertaining all 
possibilities regarding a certain instance, it is much easier to agree with a false belief. 
Confirmation bias is arguably more prevalent in modern-day interactions due to the creation of 
technology and the internet. Social media, targeted advertisements, and biased news reporting has 
created major polarization and a deeper confidence in possibly incorrect beliefs due to extensive 
flooding of agreeable information. The polarized communities formed through social networks of 
likeminded people are referred to as echo chambers (Del Vicario et al., 2017). Echo chambers 
embrace and strengthen confirmation bias in individuals because the majority, if not all, the 
information they are receiving or exposed to is already in support of their pre-disposed beliefs. This 
leads to common misconceptions as if a false idea is passed down enough times, it is likely to be 
believed as cross-referencing an idea is one of the best ways to prove it.  
2.3. Behavioral Finance 
In the field of finance, there is the study of behavioral finance which investigates psychology’s 
influence on financial markets and investors. Cookson et al. (2021) expands on behavioral finance 
beginning with a phenomenon known as disagreement, where people inherently have a “selective 
exposure to confirmatory information”. With this, he also expands on selective exposure theory 
which is defined as “the study of biased information acquisition” (Knobloch-Westerwick, 2014). 
Cookson combined these concepts to explain that echo chambers “emerge when individuals tilt their 
information acquisition toward sources that confirm their prior views” (Cookson et al., 2021). It is 
common for financial investors or traders to be following social networks that endorse their existing 
beliefs regarding financial markets, which leads to confirmation bias in trading behavior.  
Echo chambers can be unintentional as they often arise through social media algorithms that 
solely recommend information based on commonly researched topics or the social networks one 
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follows. Through reviewing the social media page StockTwits, a large social network for investors 
and traders, Cookson finds behavior exemplifying confirmation bias through its follower’s social 
media activity. When observing the differences in the newsfeed of potential investors, he finds that 
“a bull[ish investor] will see 62 more bullish messages and 24 fewer bearish messages than a bear[ish] 
investor over the same period” (2021) of time. It would be beneficial for investors to entertain 
information that may disprove their current beliefs or financial stance on a stock based on the fact 
that they prioritize their wealth over anything else when trading. However, this does not seem to be 
the case as investors tend to exemplify confirmation bias, even before they are exhibiting true trading 
behavior, through the information they expose themselves to.  
In her article, Nelson (2014) analyzes the possibility that economists are affected in their analyses 
by stereotypes and confirmation bias. She introduced an idea by Kahneman (2003) on the cognitive 
sciences of human behavior in that humans tend to systematically deviate from norms of context-
free impartiality and logic. In other words, people do not always treat all aspects of a situation equally 
and can often stray from logic. This supports the theory that economists may be facing bias and 
stereotype in their behaviors as humans would cognitively tend to. It seems difficult to completely 
be free of confirmation bias as an economist or financial analyst because the monetary desire of a 
financially positive scenario would lead most humans to confirm that scenario through the discovery 
of new information.  
Camerer (1987) ran an experiment to test whether judgment bias and choice violations have an 
effect in financial markets. He uses experimental markets to test traders that are paid dividends in 
specific circumstances to see if they judge the probability of the event based on prior information or 
on the “representativeness” of the sample. He suggests, with reference to Kenneth Arrow (1982), 
that evidence of judgment bias is reported in traders in the use of the representativeness heuristic 
with over-reaction to current information. This over-reaction can also be characterized as 
overconfidence in current beliefs held by traders which is considered a form of confirmation bias. 
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2.4. Confirmation Bias in Finance 
Political occasions can also be tied to changes in the economy as there may be uncertainty in 
expectations which leads to an instability of the market. This uncertainty leads financial analysts and 
traders to exhibit confirmation bias through assessing their financial positions and beliefs. The 1993 
Canadian election included a contract market stemming from the belief from economists that 
“markets are efficient aggregators of information” (Forsythe et al., 1998).  These shares of contracts 
were identified with political parties in reference to the number of seats to be won by the 
corresponding party. This framework created a market where the cost of the contract reflected the 
percentage of seats that were expected to win by the corresponding party. This is one of few ways to 
measure confirmation bias through numbered data as the change in cost reflects the change in 
popular opinions. 
Forsythe et al., (1998) conducted an experiment on judgment bias and traders’ behaviors and 
expectations regarding the election market in 1993. This directly relates to our own research and 
experiment without the aspect of political parties. They gauge traders’ expectations regarding the 
results of the election through the value of the corresponding contracts in order to measure effects 
of certain events. However, the data collected in this paper through surveying future investors are 
expectations prior to trading. This observes how deeply traders follow through with their forecasts, 
rather than being able to judge their expectations during the trading period as the election contracts 
allows by viewing prices at specific periods in time. Confirmation bias is investigated within our 
investors and market to see if forecasting has any impact on trading behavior and if forecasting with 
further reason reinforces confirmation bias in the individual.  
The fact that traders do not want to lose money enhances confirmation bias in an economic 
market because the trader sets a goal of making a profit and chooses a hypothesis that might support 
this. The trader further tends to support this hypothesis through research and affirmation from 
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sources in support of the theory rather than trying to disprove ideas that contradict the hypothesis. 
It is common to search for positive reasons why the trade may be successful, and the following 
information may persuade the trader to follow an unprofitable path that could have been avoided if 
more information was indulged.  Forsythe et al. expresses the importance of “distinguish[ing] the 
average trader from the marginal trader” (1998). Although, the marginal trader may still be somewhat 
biased, their increased attentiveness to the changes in the market will lead to a lower likelihood of 
persistence towards their initial biases if there is evidence found through their attentiveness that 
guides them in a different direction. The same level of biased traders that are inattentive to the 
changes in the companies are likely to exhibit more confirmation bias.  
Cipriano and Gruca (2015) ran an experiment investigating an idea particularly similar to the 
hypothesis tested in this thesis. They searched for confirmation bias’s effects on market prices in 
financial markets through traders that forecasted and explained their forecast in real-money box 
office movie markets. The null hypothesis tested in this thesis is that the net positions of traders 
forecasting a company to win a contract race, with or without justification, are not significantly 
different from traders who do not forecast and do not show signs of confirmation bias in traders; 
leaving the alternative hypothesis to state that forecasting does affect net positions and shows 
evidence of confirmation bias in traders. They mention a market model by Kent Daniel, et al. (1998) 
that states “trader overconfidence is the source of the biased assimilation form of confirmation bias”. 
Biased assimilation is the tendency to be more positive towards information one already agrees with 
and negative towards information inconsistent with one’s beliefs. Cipriano believes when estimating 
an asset’s value, traders tend to overweigh the accuracy of initial private information and underweight 
value-relevant, public information unless it confirms the initial private information. Confirmation 
bias is present in traders when ignoring relevant information that is not in-line with the pre-existing 
beliefs of the financial markets.  
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Cipriano, Gruca, and Goins (2015) ran another experiment using a nearly identical experimental 
variable to the previous experiment: four real-money prediction markets with security values tied to 
a movie’s box office performance. Traders again submitted forecasts prior to the opening of the 
trading markets. Through examining the trading volume, timing, prices, and trader returns they 
found that in three of the four markets, there were indications of over-confidence associated with 
traders that forecasted the winning contract. Over-confidence may be a key driver to confirmation 
bias as being over-confident can lead to confirming one’s initial beliefs. 
3. Data 
In this thesis, I study how confirmation bias may affect traders and investors in financial 
markets. My data sample is based on contract trading activity by student traders and the survey they 
were given prior to the beginning of the trading period. The survey asks to forecast winning 
contracts with and without reasoning and was conducted in a local market to view if forecasting 
increases confirmation bias in trading behaviors of investors by viewing net aggregate positions of 
traders at different time periods. 
3.1. Iowa Electronics Market: Basics 
 The market used for data collection to evaluate the hypothesis of the thesis was the Iowa 
Electronic Markets. The traders for this market consisted of students in the Investment Management 
course at the University of Iowa. The data collected and used for the purposes of this thesis took 
place in the Fall 2020 semester.  
 The Iowa Electronics Market consists of two main markets: the Inter-Industry Returns Market 
and the Index Returns Market. The trading periods for these two markets both take place in monthly 
periods and open and close at the same time (the Monday after the third Friday of every month). 
The data collected began September 21
st
, 2020 as that was the opening day of the first period of Iowa 
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Electronic Markets. The closing date of the first period of trading was October 19
th
, 2020 but the 
final trade of this period took place on October 17
th
. 
3.2. Contracts and Bundles 
For the purposes of this thesis, the primary focus was the Inter-Industry Returns Market, which 
contained a contract for each of the individually listed company’s common stock; Walt Disney 
Company (DIS), Simon Property Group (SPG), Walgreens Boots Alliance (WBA), General Motors 
Company (GM), Microsoft Corporation (MSFT), and Exxon Mobil Corporation (XOM).  The 
contracts are traded freely by the participating student traders which their trading behavior formulates 
the contract market prices. Contracts are traded between $0  and $1 because these are the liquidation 
amounts for losing and winning contracts respectively. Every trading period is open for 4 weeks 
before the payoff at the end when the winning contract is liquidated for $1 and all other contracts 
liquidated for $0. The trading period observed in this thesis of 2 weeks consists of half of a full 4-
week trading period. The winning contract is determined by being the company with the highest rate 
of return based on their stock price in the 4-week trading period. Student traders decide a price they 
are willing to buy or sell each contract for, between $0 and $1, and the IEM algorithm uses the 
supply and demand between traders to create current contract prices. Traders may commit to market 
order, in which they can execute a buy or sale of a contract immediately, based on current market 
prices. They may also commit to a limit order to execute a buy or sale of a contract, set for any 
period of time, for the price point of their choosing. 
Traders can also purchase two types of bundles in either market, market price bundles or fixed 
price bundles, both of which contain one of every contract in its corresponding market. A market 
price bundle’s cost is equal to the sum of all contract’s current trading market prices in the Iowa 
Electronics Market. A fixed price bundle’s cost is always equal to $1 and is usually more popular 
because it is uncommon for the market price bundle to cost under a dollar. However, purchasing a 
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market price bundle for under $1 would lead to instant profit because at least one of the contracts 
will be liquidated for $1, therefore should be executed at any given time. Each of these two bundles 
grant the same contents to the buyer’s portfolio: one of each contract in its respective market.  
3.3. Compared to Stock Exchange and Trading Strategy 
Iowa Electronic Market contracts are bought and sold at any price between $0 and $1 and can 
be traded for at any time, as long as it falls within the (4-week) monthly trading period. For this 
reason, the IEM differentiates itself from the usual stock exchange because in most stock exchanges, 
traders may only buy or sell stocks between 9:00 A.M. and 5:00 P.M., eastern standard time, Monday 
through Friday. In the IEM, at the end of each trading period, the contract with the highest 
percentage rate of return during that period, also considered the winning contract, is liquidated for 
$1 while all other contracts are liquidated for $0. The goal of trading these contracts in the Inter-
Industry Returns Market would be to observe all the companies’ news and returns to predict which 
of the six companies will achieve the greatest level of return. The level of return is determined by 
percentage change in common stock price from the beginning to the end of the trading period.  
Similar to trading stocks on a standard stock exchange, traders may use all publicly available 
information to research recent company-specific news and current financial data, paired with some 
intuition, to trade contracts as they see fit. This will lead to the market contracts, in essence, creating 
their own prices based on the amount the buyers are willing to pay and the amount the sellers are 
willing to receive for the specified contract. Traders that are assessing the six companies in the market 
the most consistently and accurately tend to obtain greater profits because they take advantage of 
buying contracts predicted to be undervalued and sell contracts predicted to be overvalued. Active 
traders also further their advantage through purchasing market price bundles that are valued under 
$1 because they are more likely to come across them than traders that are paying less attention or 
are less active in the Iowa Electronic Markets.  
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3.4. IEM Survey Data appendix survey questions 
Prior to trading, a survey was presented to the student traders with randomly allocated questions 
to create three testing groups: forecasting with reason, forecasting without reason, and the control 
(no forecast). These groups were randomly created through the Qualtrics Online Survey Software 
by randomization of who received which questions. The forecasting with reasoning question asked 
the student which company they believe will win and why they believe this to be the case while the 
forecasting without reason question excluded the explanation (Ref. Appx. 1). For a company to win 
a contract race, they must receive they greatest rate of return (percentage increase) on their 
company’s stock price compared to the other five companies, in every 4-week trading period. A 
winning company contract, at the every 4-week trading, has a payoff value of $1 while all other 
company contracts have payoff values of $0. The survey was given to student traders on September 
22, 2020, the same date as the beginning of the trading period and it is assumed the student trader’s 
forecasts are targeted for this upcoming trading period after the survey takes place. The control 
group was not presented either question on forecasting but was presented a filler, irrelevant question 
to be able to label it as the control group. This survey will serve as part of the data necessary to find 
if confirmation bias exists in investors’ trading behaviors. 
3.5. Time Periods and Trader Activity 
 The traders are observed only through the first two weeks (September 22nd-October 2nd) of 
trading to see if they are more prone to holding their forecasted company’s contract. Our observation 
method includes calculating and viewing net aggregate positions of traders’ contracts for only the first 
two weeks of trading. The first two weeks of trading are likely to be more directly related to the 
forecasts from the survey compared to later periods of trading because the traders are more likely to 
remember and act on their corresponding survey forecasts.  
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 How actively a certain trader is trading, given they invest a relatively greater amount of money in 
their forecasted company contract than other traders, can also be assessed to argue towards 
confirmation bias. One may argue that a less active, and hence, less knowledgeable, trader seems 
more likely to follow initial instincts and beliefs than a trader that is aware of current market activity 
and may change their financial stance, according to their initial forecast, based on that fact. Traders’ 
total holdings are determined by calculating the total sum of all trades, contract and bundle purchases 
and sales, for each specific buyer at a specified time period.  
I use the IEM market price data of every single trade to determine and assess net aggregate 
positions of traders. For each trader and each company-specific contract, I compute the net aggregate 
position by adding all contract purchases and subtracting all contract sales for each specific contract 
in a given time for each individual trader, including bundle purchases and sales. This allows me to 
view if traders that believed in certain companies prior to trading are more confident in their initial 
forecast and, in turn, trade heavier on that specific stock than those with no forecast. I also assess if 
traders without an explanation to their forecast were less likely to follow-through and trust that 
company through trading behavior than those with explanation. These assessments are used to 
observe the level or existence of confirmation bias in traders based on forecasting and if forecasting 
with reason changes said behavior.  
3.6. Data Retrieval and Variables 
The majority of the data used for the purposes of this thesis is created through the Iowa 
Electronic Markets (IEM) student trading data (Ref. Section 3.1.). Professor Thomas Gruca assisted 
greatly in analyzing and providing this data for the purposes of this research thesis. The data includes 
the date of each trade, if the trade was a bundle, the asset ID of the contract traded, the quantity 
traded, the price of the trade, the seller’s ID if applicable, and the buyer’s ID if applicable. When 
referencing the date, we used the first two weeks of trades, from September 21st, 2020 to October 
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2nd, 2020, for our initial data analysis and results. Bundles include one of each of the six contracts at 
a fixed price of $1 if a trader wants to buy or sell one; a less common market-price bundle also exists 
which is valued at the sum of all the contract’s market prices. The main asset IDs are 3203, 3204, 
3205, 3206, 3207, and 3208 and are representative of a contract in Walt Disney, General Motors, 
Microsoft, Simon Property Group, Walgreens, and Exxon Mobil respectively (matched 
alphabetically by stock ticker; DIS, GM, MSFT, SPG, WBA, XOM). The quantity represents how 
many contracts were traded in that trade for that specified contract and the price represents the price 
at which each contract traded for. The seller’s and buyer’s ID references the trader ID associated to 
each participating trader. The list of trader ID’s to student name was provided by Professor Sinagl 
in order to be used to assess trading activity compared to their results from the survey.  
4. Methodology 
4.1. Qualtrics Survey Questions 
The survey given to the student traders, composed by Professor Petra Sinagl and myself, was 
conducted through the University of Iowa’s student website with Qualtrics Online Survey Software. 
The importance of this survey stems from one question forming two posed to the students: Which 
company between the six do you believe will be the winning contract? The second, potential follow-
up question included justifying reasoning of the first question’s answer. (Ref. Sect. 3.3. and Appx. 1) 
With only slightly fewer than a hundred participants in the survey, dividing the test groups created 
by this question (Ref. Section 3.4.) into three groups makes for generally small test sample sizes at 

















































Table 1: Amounts of each contract forecasted/justified to win by each trader 
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there are six contracts to choose between, estimating an average of about 11 total forecasts, with and 
without justification, per contract. The actual survey yielded exactly 31 responses for the control 
group, 30 for the forecast with justification group, and 36 for those forecasting without any 
justification.  However,  the  survey’s  results  (Ref.  Table  1)  included  more  outliers  as  Microsoft 
received  over  half of  the total  forecasts with 38  out of  the  total  66  forecasts  while  Walt  Disney 
received the second most forecasts at 13. The company with the lowest number of forecasts was 
Simon Property Group with only two forecasts and both of them without justification (leaving SPG 
Justified the only variable with zero forecasts and unable to make any inferences or regressions). 
Simon Property Group, General Motors, Walgreens, and Exxon Mobil all have five or less forecasts, 
making it difficult to make a viable or confident judgment on the resulting data. As Microsoft has a 
decent number of forecasts and both variables are equal at 19 each, it is the most viable contract to 
observe for data analysis and inferences. Walt Disney may have enough of a sample size to observe 
but is still generally too small. 
  For use as the independent variable in regression analysis, a table was created using the results 
from the Qualtrics survey data. Each company contract is designated two rows (one for choosing a 
forecast and one for justifying the forecast) in addition to the control group at the end for a total of 
13 rows of data (Ref. Table 2). The number “1” is given for the trader’s answer or position in 
reference to the survey and the number “0” for all 12 other entries. If the trader was not asked any 






































1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Table 2: Example of survey results coding method; 1: trader is in corresponding category, 0: trader is not in corresponding category 
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4.2. IEM Methodology 
 After receiving the data from the Iowa Electronics Market, the first two weeks of all trades 
(09/22/20 – 10/02/20) were separated which accounts for the first half of the first trading period 
because each trading period before liquidation is a 4-week period. It is also the most recent trading 
activity since the student traders have taken the survey and will lead to more current reactions 
stemming from the survey opinions. 
I computed traders’ positions in individual contracts by summing up each individual contract 
purchase and sale by each respective trader. Two following pivot tables were created:  (Ref. Tables 
3.1, 3.2) the first for contract purchases and the second for contract sales. The variable “IsBundle” 
is shown because we needed to filter out one of the bundle sub-variables which duplicates bundle 
purchases and sales. There was one entry for each asset ID as well as an additional entry that gave a 










Bundle   Sum of 
Quantity 
Contract ID’s    
SALES/ 
SELLERS 
3203 3204 3205 3206 3207 3208 
26300 2 4 2 3 4 3 
26988 3 14 6 2 1 2 
27245 0 0 2 0 0 0 
Table 3.1: Example of actual 
2-week purchase trading data 
for each contract per trader  
Bundle   Sum of 
Quantity 
Contract ID’s    
BUYS/ 
BUYERS 
3203 3204 3205 3206 3207 3208 
26988 4 18 6 2 2 3 
27245 2 2 2 2 2 2 
27249 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Table 3.2: Example of actual 
2-week purchase trading data 
for each contract per trader 
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I then combined these two tables into one by subtracting the sales from the purchases for each 
individual trader and contract to create the net asset positions (Ref. Table 4) and further matched 
the trader ID to the name of the trader using data provided by Professor Sinagl and Excel formula 
function “VLOOKUP”. 
 
On the same sheet, as more variables are added horizontally (Ref. Table 5), they are kept in line 
to match the information to reference the trader in the same column. In order to find net holdings 
of individual contracts, relative to other contracts, I first computed the minimum position of the six 
contracts for each trader and subtracted that minimum from each of the six contract positions to 
create an unbalanced net portfolio which rids bundles held for each trader. Next, I multiplied the 
holding positions by the price of the contracts to get the total value of each holding, valued at current 
market prices from the end of October 2nd, 2020 to provide the unbalanced priced holdings on this 
date for each contract and trader. 
The unbalanced priced holdings are all the dollar values, based on contract prices on October 
2nd, 2020, of unique contracts held by each trader, which exclude bundles held, giving a more 
accurate weight on individual traders’ contract preference. They are each then divided by the sum 
Table 4: Example of trading 
purchases and sales combined 
results; VLOOKUP Excel formula 
used in the last column to find 
trader names that match trader IDs 
 
Trader ID 3203 3204 3205 3206 3207 3208 Names 
26988 1 4 0 0 1 1 ExampleName 
27245 2 2 0 2 2 2 ExampleName 
27249 1 1 1 1 1 1 ExampleName 
27250 0 0 0 0 0 1 ExampleName 
Unbalanced Net Portfolio Unbalanced Priced Holdings @ 10/2 
3203 3204 3205 3206 3207 3208 3203 3204 3205 3206 3207 3208 SUM 
1 1 0 1 1 3 $    
0.165 
$   
0.200 
$           
- 
$     
0.200 
$    
0.179 
$   
0.393 
$   
1.137 
1 4 0 1 1 1 $    
0.165 
$   
0.800 
$           
- 
$     
0.200 
$    
0.179 
$   
0.131 
$   
1.475 
2 2 0 2 2 2 $    
0.330 
$   
0.400 
$           
- 
$     
0.400 
$    
0.358 
$   
0.262 
$   
1.750 
Table 5: Example of each trader’s net aggregate portfolio results; net portfolio 
excludes all bundles currently held; holdings are dated and priced at 10/2/20 
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of all the unbalanced priced holdings for each trader to create balanced priced holdings (Ref. Table 
6) for each contract and trader. This is also used as the dependent variable for running regression 
analysis to try to find correlation with the amount held by a trader and their survey forecast. 
4.3. Regression Methodology 
Regression analysis via Excel is used to compare the balanced priced holdings for each contract 
as the dependent variable (Ref. Table 6) against the respective contract’s “chose” and “justified” 
columns from the survey responses (Ref. Table 2) as the independent variable, resulting in 6 initial 
regressions, separated for each individual company contract. With these regressions, I aim to find 
out whether traders with initial beliefs that a certain contract will win invested relatively more money 
in this contract than the average trader.  
The null hypothesis tested by these regressions is that the net positions of traders forecasting a 
company to win a contract race, with or without justification, are not significantly different from 
traders who do not forecast and do not increase confirmation bias in traders; leaving the alternative 
hypothesis to state that forecasting affects net positions and confirmation bias in traders. 
Our regression model equation is:  
Net Position of Trader X in Contract Y  
= Intercept + B1 * “chosen” dummy variable + B2 * “justified” dummy variable + residual 
I regress the net position of a trader X in contract Y on two dummy variables that are created 
based on survey results. The “’chosen’ dummy variable”  equals 1 when traders X answered the 
forecasting only question (Ref. Appx. 1) in reference to contract Y. The “’justified’” dummy variable”  
Balanced Priced Holdings (Dependent Variable) 
SUM 3203 3204 3205 3206 3207 3208 
 $   1.137   $   0.145   $   0.176   $          -     $   0.176   $   0.157   $   0.346  
 $   1.475   $   0.112   $   0.542   $          -     $   0.136   $   0.121   $   0.089  
 $   1.750   $   0.189   $   0.229   $          -     $   0.229   $   0.205   $   0.150  
Table 6: Example of dollar value of each contract held by every trader priced on 10/2/20 (balanced to total $1 for each trader) 
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equals 1 when traders X answered the forecasting with justification question (Ref. Appx. 1) in 
reference to contract Y. Variables “B1” and “B2” are the regression coefficients attached to these 
two variables, respectively. Dummy variables for both, chosen and justified, categories are specific 
to an individual contract and individual trader. If the trader forecasted for either the “chosen” or 
“justified” category, based on the survey observations (Ref. Appx. 1 and Section 4.1), the dummy 
variable for that corresponding category will be 1 and the other will be 0. The “control” column from 
the survey responses (Ref. Table 2) are accounted for when running the initial forecast regressions 
for all of the individual companies because if a trader was in the control group, the first 12 columns 
corresponding to company forecasts would be “0”.  
The regression is carried out through the standard pre-programmed Excel regression tool which 
is based on the ordinary least squares method for estimating linear regression model parameters. 
This method minimizes least squares of residual errors and provides sum of square differences 
between the observed and predicted values. This will provide data with statistics such as P-value, T-
statistic, significance-F, and independent variable coefficients to determine whether or not there is 
any significance between the priced holdings per trader and that same trader’s initial forecast and 
how impactful or significant the data may be. Resulting regressions are shown under the regression 
results section. (Ref. Section 5.2.) 
Significance-F statistic includes a balanced combination of the 2, “chosen” and “justified”, 
independent dummy variables and refers to the probability that the null hypothesis is true; a low 
probability would mean the null hypothesis should be rejected. In other words, the significance-F 
represents the percentage of forecasts for that given company that did not have any effect on net 
positions of traders. P-value is identical to significance-F but is only representative for each 
independent dummy variable (only forecasted or forecasted and justified). T-statistic refers to the 
variation in the sample data and directly affects the P-value and so is not required to be detailed in 
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each analysis (greater T-statistic = lower P-value). Coefficients are the level of balanced holding 
percentage per forecast-type; a positive and greater coefficient represents greater holdings when 
forecasted (and justified) for the company implying greater levels of confirmation bias may exist in 
that instance.  
5. Results with Discussion and Contribution 
5.1. Assessing Confirmation Bias 
Firstly, net positions of traders and their trading activity are matched against their specified 
company forecast as to which company they believe will win the contract race, which took place 
prior to trading in the survey. If the net aggregate positions, or balanced priced holdings, of traders 
that forecasted success of their companies are greater than the average net aggregate position of 
that specific contract per trader, then confirmation bias may exist for those specified traders. 
The average balanced priced holdings for all traders are shown below (Ref. Table 7).  
 
 Any pattern found in this observation that includes a trader’s higher than average net position 
for the contracts forecasted to win can be explained by an unconscious confirmation bias in investors 
and trading behavior. Evidence of this is seen in many traders that have a greater than average 
balanced priced holding in either Disney or Microsoft while also being the company they forecasted 
to win. However, there does not seem to be a large difference between forecasting with or without 
reasoning as many forecasters without justification were still likely to hold their forecasted company’s 
contract at a greater value than the average trader but not much greater than those with justification. 
The student traders may unintentionally fixate on trading the contract of the company they projected 
to win and not only potentially ignore information about the other five companies, but also ignore 
Average Trader's Balanced Priced Holdings per Contract 
 DIS   GM   MSFT   SPG   WBA   XOM  
 $   
0.159  
 $   
0.081  
 $   
0.207  
 $   
0.074  
 $   
0.089  
 $   
0.094  
Table 7: Average total balanced priced 
holdings: dollar value of each contract held 
by every trader priced on 10/2/20 (balanced 
to $1 for each trader) 
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negative information that may somewhat disprove the initial forecast. In this event, confirmation bias 
is a reasonable explanation as to why the traders are not as open to outside and differing information 
as they normally may have been if they did not forecast prior to trading; or did not provide reason. 
5.2. Regression Results and Contribution 
When observing the regression results, balanced priced holdings for each individual company 
contract (Ref. Table 6) are used as the dependent variable against the survey results coding (Ref. 
Table 2) as the independent variable. To evaluate the null hypothesis, that the net positions of traders 
forecasting a company to win a contract race, with or without justification, are not significantly 
different from traders who do not forecast and do not increase confirmation bias in traders, I use a 
10% level for significance (P-value).  
If P-values are less than 10% and the estimated coefficient attached to one of the dummy 
variables is positive, I reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative consistent with a presence 
of confirmation bias among the sample of student traders. I also report the value of estimated 
coefficients for the dummy variables to indicate the change in balanced holding percentage per 
forecast. 
5.2.1. Microsoft Corporation (MSFT) Regression Analysis (Ref. Table 8.1) 
Microsoft received by far the greatest number of forecasts with 38 (Ref. Section 4. Table 1), split 
perfectly for forecasts with and without justification, and is thus observed with the most confidence. 
Given a significance-F < 0.06 means, for Microsoft, there is less than a 6% chance the forecasts 
combined do not affect net position levels of traders or raise evidence of confirmation bias. With a 
P-value < 0.02 and a positive estimated coefficient (of about 0.21) attached to the justified dummy 
variable, I conclude that an average trader that forecasted Microsoft to win and justified why, had 
about a $0.21 higher net aggregate position in Microsoft. These results are consistent with the 
existence of confirmation bias among student traders.  
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Since the P-value falls within our significance level of < 10%, we reject the null hypothesis and 
claim the alternative: that forecasting, especially with justification, leads to different net positions and 
shows signs of confirmation bias. This means that confirmation bias seems to be playing a role in 
this scenario as traders that justified their reasoning towards their beliefs that Microsoft will be the 
winning contract also had the tendency to hold a greater percentage of Microsoft contracts in their 
portfolio.  
If we only focus on the chosen dummy variable, we cannot come to the same conclusion 
confirming the existence of confirmation bias because the chosen dummy variable P-value of 0.58 > 
0.1. This means there is a 58% chance that the forecasts without justification for Microsoft, do not 
significantly affect confirmation bias in traders. The null hypothesis should then be accepted and 
disregard forecasts without justification. Traders who only forecasted Microsoft to win without 
providing justification did not have significantly different net positions from the average trader. 
5.2.2. Walt Disney Company (DIS) Regression Analysis (Ref. Table 8.2) 
Disney regression data results are the second best option because it received the second greatest 
number of forecasts; but with a total of only 13, it is still not too sufficient to make a strong claim for 
or against the null hypothesis based on the resulting statistics. The significance-F of 0.24 > 0.1 for 
Disney, there is about a 24% chance the forecasts combined do not affect net position levels of 
traders or raise evidence of confirmation bias. This exceeds our significance level of 10% and thus, 
the results are weakened in confidence. With a P-value of 0.095, almost equal to the significance 
level, and a positive estimated coefficient (of again about 0.21), attached to the chosen dummy 
variable, I conclude that an average trader that forecasted Disney to win without justifying why, had 
about a $0.21 higher net aggregate position in Disney. These results are consistent with the existence 
of confirmation bias among student traders but weakened due to the fact that the P-value is near 10% 
and only 7 students forecasted without justification for Disney.  
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Since the P-value falls within our significance level of < 10%, we reject the null hypothesis and 
claim the alternative: that forecasting, especially with justification, leads to different net positions and 
shows signs of confirmation bias. This means that it is plausible confirmation bias may be playing a 
role in this scenario as traders that forecasted without reasoning that Disney will be the winning 
contract, also had the tendency to hold a greater percentage of Disney contracts in their portfolio.  
If we only focus on the justified dummy variable, we cannot come to the same conclusion 
confirming the existence of confirmation bias because the justified dummy variable P-value of 0.73 
> 0.1. This means there is a 73% chance that the forecasts with justification for Disney, do not 
significantly affect confirmation bias in traders. The null hypothesis should then be accepted and 
disregard forecasts with justification. Traders who only forecasted Microsoft to win and provided 
justification did not have significantly different net positions from the average trader. 
5.2.3. Exxon Mobil Corporation (XOM) Regression Analysis (Ref. Table 8.3) 
Only 5 total forecasts for Exxon Mobil to win makes claims based on the statistics weaker due 
to lower predictive power on a small sample size. However, received the best significance-F of 0.006 
< 0.1, meaning there is about a 1% chance the forecasts combined do not affect net position levels 
of traders or raise evidence of confirmation bias. With also the best P-value of 0.001 < 0.1 and the 
greatest positive estimated coefficient (of about 0.52), attached to the justified dummy variable, I 
conclude that an average trader that forecasted Exxon Mobil to win while justifying why, had about 
a $0.52 higher net aggregate position in Exxon contracts. These results are consistent with the 
existence of confirmation bias among student traders but weakened due to the fact that only 2 
students forecasted with justification for Exxon Mobil to win.  
If these results were given in a larger sample, we would reject the null hypothesis and claim that 
confirmation bias seems to be playing a role in this scenario as traders that justified their reasoning 
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towards their beliefs that Exxon will be the winning contract also had the tendency to hold a greater 
percentage of Exxon Mobil contracts in their portfolio. 
If we only focus on the chosen dummy variable, we cannot come to the same conclusion 
confirming the existence of confirmation bias because the chosen dummy variable P-value of 0.77 > 
0.1 is too high and is paired with a negative coefficient. This means there is a 77% chance that the 
forecasts without justification for Exxon, do not significantly affect confirmation bias in traders. The 
null hypothesis should then be accepted and disregard forecasts without justification. Traders who 
only forecasted Exxon to win without providing justification did not have significantly different net 
positions from the average trader. 
5.2.4. General Motors Company (GM) Regression Analysis (Ref. Table 8.4) 
The combination of the small number of total forecasts of 5, the significance-F and P-values 
being well over 10%, and a negative coefficient for the chosen dummy variable leads to a high chance 
that the null hypothesis is true. The null hypothesis should then be accepted and both forecasts with 
and without justification should be disregarded. Traders forecasted General Motors to win did not 
have significantly different net positions from the average trader or show any signs of confirmation 
bias. 
5.2.5. Walgreens Boots Alliance (WBA) Regression Analysis (Ref. Table 8.5) 
Similar to the situation with General Motors, Walgreens total forecasts were also only 5, face 
even more severe statistics with the significance-F and P-values close to 1, and again a negative 
coefficient for the chosen dummy variable. This means there is almost a 100% chance that the null 
hypothesis is true for traders forecasting for Walgreens. The null hypothesis is accepted, and we 
conclude that traders forecasted Walgreens to win did not have significantly different net positions 
from the average trader or show any signs of confirmation bias. 
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5.2.6. Simon Property Group (SPG) Regression Analysis (Ref. Table 8.6) 
With the smallest sample size with total forecasts of only 2 while the forecast with justification  
received 0 votes, meaning no analysis can be made because there is no data for the justification 
dummy variable. With a P-value of 0.007 < 0.1 and coefficient of 0.31 for the chosen dummy 
variable, I conclude that an average trader that forecasted Simon Property Group to win without 
justifying why, had about a $0.31 higher net aggregate position in SPG. These results are consistent 
with the existence of confirmation bias among student traders. However, with the very small sample 
size of only 2 forecasts, we cannot make a strong claim that there is in fact evidence of confirmation 
bias behind forecasting without justification in this instance. 
5.3. Discussion of Results 
A common problem with the regression results, which aim to find if there is a greater holding in 
some company contracts when forecasted for them to win, is that there are not enough total forecasts, 
or too small of a sample size. Out of the six contracts forecasted for, each of the bottom four contracts 
only received between 2 to 5 forecasts. These are too small of sample sizes to make a strong 
prediction on the effects of confirmation bias because it is not reasonable to make a prediction or 
claim on a hypothesis based on the actions of only a few people. When a sample size is too small in 
any statistical analysis, predictive power is not accurately depicted because we cannot confidently 
anticipate specific trading behaviors. The fact that some companies are much more well-known and 
popular than others, such as Microsoft and Disney, also leads to issues with regression results 
because these mentioned companies, being the most popular, clearly received the most forecast 
votes as well. This may be due to popularity bias which in one aspect can be complimented by 
confirmation bias if the trader has the tendency to confirm their beliefs by primarily considering 
positive information about the company. This bias in popular companies also led to the other four 
companies having much lower total forecasts which made it difficult to make a strong claim based 
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on those corresponding regression results. Some student traders may have also not given their full 
attention or shown much care towards this trading exercise which would further lead to inaccurate 
results. In this event, confirmation bias would not be able to be predicted because this sort of 
behavior is not representative of an active trader that cares about their money. 
6. Conclusion 
6.1. Further Research 
The basis of this experiment is to test if confirmation bias exists in investors and traders that 
forecast their beliefs towards an investment and further leads to a higher likelihood of purchasing or 
holding that investment. To better test this hypothesis, the experiment should be replicated with a 
much larger sample size since the total amount of forecasts for our entire experiment was only 66 
split amongst six companies; averaging only 11 forecasts per company which would be too small of 
sample sizes to make a credible claim on resulting analysis. Another problem, as mentioned in the 
previous section, is the inclusion of only a couple popular companies matched in contract trading 
against much less popular companies. One way to solve this problem could be to use the largest 
market capitalization and most popular companies to represent the six competing company 
contracts; an example of six large and popular companies, as of today, are Microsoft, Tesla, Amazon, 
Google, Facebook, and Apple. This may reduce the possibility of traders having a higher holding 
percentage for a company simply because the trader held their popular choice. 
When mainly considering Microsoft’s contract trading in reference to the forecasts prior to 
trading, it is seen through the regression statistics that there is definitely some correlation for traders 
that forecasted with justification as they held generally $0.21 more in their balanced priced holdings 
for every forecast with justification. This company’s regression data is the sole indicator used towards 
answering our hypothesis because it has the greatest number of forecasts. Microsoft received nearly 
three times the forecasts of Disney, which received the second most forecasts, and 19-times the 
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forecasts of Simon Property Group, which received the least. Although it can be inferred that some 
confirmation bias may exist through the resulting regression statistics, it may also be due to other 
factors mentioned previously such as giving little desire or attention to the IEM contract trading itself, 
or only siding with a familiar or popular choice. 
REGRESSION STATISTICS 









df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 2 0.282646055 0.141323027 1.450719791 0.239546622
Residual 95 9.254500897 0.097415799
Total 97 9.537146952
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 0.141038446 0.033853629 4.166124845 6.82567E-05 0.073830495 0.208246398
DIS-CHOSEN 0.207258091 0.122729829 1.688734454 0.094550274 -0.036391425 0.450907607








df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 2 0.623870223 0.31193511 2.923699484 0.058586551
Residual 95 10.13573241 0.10669192
Total 97 10.75960263
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 0.15775432 0.042168693 3.74102944 0.00031351 0.074038882 0.2414698
MSFT-CHOSEN 0.04738767 0.08598583 0.55111024 0.582851942 -0.123315783 0.2180911










df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 2 0.527757716 0.2638789 5.4741843 0.005622031
Residual 95 4.579402172 0.0482042
Total 97 5.107159889
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 0.08505999 0.022766754 3.7361493 0.0003189 0.039862271 0.1302577
XOM-CHOSEN -0.03835767 0.128788209 -0.297835 0.7664792 -0.294034597 0.2173192
XOM-JUSTIFIED 0.51570924 0.156909024 3.2866767 0.0014214 0.204205441 0.827213
Table 8.3 
REGRESSION STATISTICS 









df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 2 0.001582149 0.000791 0.022381 0.977873118
Residual 95 3.357907604 0.035346
Total 97 3.359489753
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 0.08981464 0.019495353 4.606977 1.27E-05 0.051111475 0.1285178
WBA-CHOSEN -0.0216242 0.110282368 -0.19608 0.844966 -0.240562349 0.197314








df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 2 0.065935717 0.032967858 1.0494232 0.354162777
Residual 95 2.98444568 0.031415218
Total 97 3.050381397
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 0.079788499 0.018184788 4.387650824 2.9663E-05 0.043687131 0.1158899
GM-CHOSEN -0.0797885 0.126642392 -0.63002994 0.53018748 -0.33120543 0.1716284








df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 2 0.203159164 0.1015796 4.133818167 0.01899197
Residual 95 2.334418179 0.0245728
Total 97 2.537577343
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 0.06761019 0.015998966 4.22591 5.46467E-05 0.035848227 0.0993722
SPG-CHOSEN 0.31052777 0.11199276 2.7727486 0.006690198 0.088194028 0.5328615
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Appendix 1: Survey Questions 
 
 
 
